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Climate change poses a serious challenge to humanity. In its Fifth Assessment Report the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) records that 
 “To limit the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions alone to be likely less than 
2°C relative to the period 1861-1880, total CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources 
would need to be limited to a cumulative budget of about 1000 PgC since that period. 
About half [445 to 585 PgC] of this budget was already emitted by 2011” (Collins and 
Knutti 2013, p.1033). 
Humanity could emit a trillion tonnes of carbon if it wished to have a 50% chance of avoiding a 2°C 
increase in global mean temperatures, and it has emitted half of that already (Allen et al 2009; 
Meinshausen et al 2009).  At the current rate of emissions, we are set to emit the remaining half 
trillion within 22 years.2 
 
This constitutes a major challenge.  However, as the IPCC adds, the problem is actually more 
serious than this since these calculations exclude various important considerations (such as other 
greenhouse gases and the possibility of further emissions released as a result of warming), and 
we may want to have a lower probability of overshooting the 2°C target.  As it writes, 
“[a]ccounting for projected warming effect of non-CO2 forcing, a possible release of GHGs 
from permafrost or methane hydrates, or requiring a higher likelihood of temperatures 
remaining below 2°C, all imply a lower budget” (Collins and Knutti 2013, p.1033). 
To this we should add that many would say that the 2°C target is too high.  There will be 
considerable harms below that level, and note that since it is defined in terms of a global mean it 
can tolerate increases much higher than 2°C (Warren 2006).  Indeed in the Paris Agreement that 
was agreed in December 2015, a lower target was also included. Article 2.1(a) of the Paris 
Agreement specifies the goal as 
“Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of 
climate change”.3 
 
The challenges were less stark back in 1990 when the first Assessment Report emerged. 
However, in the period from 1990 till the time of writing, emissions have continued to increase.   
The IPCC records that “[t]he global 2010 emissions are 31% above the 1990 emissions” (referring 
to CO2 equivalent emissions) (Edenhofer et al 2014, p.54).  Some of this increase stems from 
those in developing countries who, faced with severe poverty, have sought to develop and raise 
themselves out of poverty.  However, the same cannot be said of the opulent lifestyles of others 
who have emitted high levels of greenhouse gases even though it is not needed for a decent 
standard of living. 																																																								
1 I am grateful to the Oxford Martin School for funding which enabled me to work on this paper. 
2 See http://trillionthtonne.org/. 
3 For the Paris Agreement see http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf. 
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 On many accounts of justice, agents (including governments, politicians more generally, 
international institutions, firms, members of civil society organizations, and individuals) have not 
complied with their responsibilities.  Furthermore, if we look ahead to the future, we have little 
reason to think that there will be high levels of compliance in the future.  The Paris Agreement, for 
example, did not specify an allocation of responsibilities, leaving each party to “prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to 
achieve” (Article 4.2.).4 
 
I :  Two Challenges 
 
This raises at least two questions.  The first question refers to people’s responsibilities. Accounts 
of climate justice ascribe a set of responsibilities.  However, since there has been widespread 
noncompliance and the indications are that this is not going to stop, we face the question: 
Q1: What should agents do when others do not discharge their climate responsibilities?   
Should agents take on extra climate responsibilities when others fail to comply?  Or are they 
released from those that would otherwise bind them when others fail to cooperate?  Or, are their 
responsibilities affected in another way?  Let us call this the Responsibility Question. 
 
The fact of noncompliance raises another question.  We might ask about the governance process.  
There have been ongoing negotiations at the international level since the creation of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, with little progress being 
made over that quarter of a century. In light of this, many have asked whether the existing 
decision-making process (one that seeks to secure agreement from the 197 states that have 
ratified the UNFCCC) should be reformed.5  The same could be said about the political process 
within states.  Some argue that existing democratic institutions cannot cope with climate change.6  
We thus face a second question: 
 Q2: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance 
structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? 
For example, should the international negotiating process be abandoned, or radically changed?  
Instead of seeking multilateral agreement should we tolerate a less inclusive decision-making 
process if that is more effective?  At the national level, should states adopt a similarly more 
authoritarian approach?  Let us call this the Governance Question. 
 
Now the two questions are, of course, related.  One of the responsibilities referred to in (Q1) might 
be to engage in political action, and so this requires reflecting on what the decision-making 
process should be (Q2).  This notwithstanding, the two questions are distinct.  First, as we shall 
see, there are many different kinds of climate responsibilities that are not focused on institutional 
design.  Second, whilst the first question might emphasize a responsibility to take some kind of 
political action we do not know what that action should be (and what kind of institutional structure 
we should be aiming for) without knowing the answer to the second question.  The two questions, 
thus, complement each other. 
 																																																								
4 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf. 
5 http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php. 
6 See, for example, the views discussed in Stehr (2015, pp.449-450). 
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Both questions are questions concerning nonideal political theory (in the sense given to that term 
by Rawls (1999 pp.8 & 216)).  Much has been written on ideal and nonideal political theory in the 
recent decade.  This has shed considerable light on concepts like feasibility and on the 
relationship between ideal and nonideal theory.7  The analysis has focused on the issues in 
general and abstract terms.  My aim in this paper is to examine what a nonideal account of climate 
justice should look like.  I shall focus primarily on the Responsibility Question (Sections II-VI) but 
will also conclude with a brief discussion of the Governance Question (Section VII). 
 
I I :  Identifying the Options 
 
To answer the Responsibility Question I advance three principles.  In each case I first present a 
general version of that principle (one designed to hold whenever there is noncompliance) and then 
follow up with a specific version (one tailored to the specific case of climate change).  Drawing on 
these, I argue that it is a mistake to think that there is any one uniquely correct way for agents to 
respond to noncompliance: it depends heavily on specific features about that agent.  There is no 
such thing as the right response to non-compliance.  I then, however, give some illustrative 
examples of the kinds of things that some common kinds of agents could reasonably be expected 
to do. 
 
The first principle is this: 
 Principle 1general version. When some fail to comply with their climate responsibilities, a 
nonideal theory of climate justice must specify all the responses available to agents 
(hereafter Principle 1gv). 
Given noncompliance, it is inescapable that there will be a shortfall of justice. This is a logical 
corollary of the fact that a theory of justice, assuming full compliance, allocates responsibilities in 
such a way that (a) others receive the protection that they are entitled to [just protection], (b) the 
duty-bearers are required to do no more than is needed to ensure (a) [just total burden], and (c), 
the burdens are shared justly among duty-bearers [just burden-sharing].  The duties are specified 
such that if everyone does what they ought to do then others will receive what they ought to 
receive.  Now, given this, if some do not honour their duties then it follows – necessarily - that 
there will be a shortfall.  Some may have less than they are entitled to [so not just protection].  Or 
others may be required to do more than they would otherwise be expected to [not just burden-
sharing].  The question then is: Where should the shortfall lie?  And to answer this we need to 
have a comprehensive account of what the options are.  This takes us to Principle 1gv above. We 
must have a clear account of the action-space available. 
What does this mean in the case of climate change?  I have argued elsewhere that there 
are six options available.  These are as follows: 
[i] Target Modification: One response in the light of noncompliance is to aim for a less ambitious 
target.  Thus at the moment the UNFCCC is committed to the goal mentioned above – “well below 
2°C”  - and it has pledged to pursue “efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”. In the light 
of noncompliance some might propose settling for a less demanding target. 
[ii] Responsibility Reallocation: A second response when some fail to discharge their 
responsibilities is for others to pick up extra responsibilities to make up for the shortfall.  If a 																																																								
7 There is now an expansive literature on ideal and non-ideal theory. My views on ideal theory are 
close to those defended by Estlund (2008, chapter XIV); Gilabert (2012, chapters 4 & 7); 
Stemplowska (2008); and Swift (2008). 
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colleague fails to mark her share of exam scripts, then maybe I should mark hers in addition to 
mine.  In the case of climate change, if some do not reduce their emissions then maybe others 
should engage in additional mitigation. 
[iii] Burden-Shifting I: A third response is what I call burden-shifting.  Some policies to mitigate and 
adapt to climate change impose unjustified burdens on third parties.  For example, using 
hydroelectric power might involve displacing indigenous peoples; using nuclear energy might pose 
health risks; taxing energy use might result in fuel poverty.  Ordinarily, agents should discharge 
their duties to mitigate in such a way that they do not impose such unjustified burdens on third 
parties.  However, in the face of noncompliance, and with a view to increasing compliance, one 
might argue that it would be better for agents to mitigate with the harmful side-effects than not to 
mitigate at all. 
[iv] Burden-Shifting II: A fourth option is a variant on this.  This fourth response is to allow victims 
of climate change to take steps that impose burdens on the noncompliers.  In doing so they act in 
ways that would otherwise be impermissible, but is permissible in this instance because the other 
has failed to discharge their duty. 
[v] Compromising other Moral Ideals: Thus far the responses have focused on justice.  For many, 
an ideal climate policy would require those engaging in mitigation and adaptation to honour moral 
ideals that go beyond the duties of justice (such as, for example, respecting the value of the 
natural world).  In light of this, a fifth response to noncompliance is to weaken these moral 
obligations and permit people to do things (such as create hydroelectric power through flooding a 
place of great intrinsic value) that would otherwise not be permitted. 
[vi] Changing the Incentive Structure: This leaves one further response to noncompliance.  This is 
to act – in a proactive way – to discourage future noncompliance.8  This can take the form of 
creating and maintaining new institutions or regulatory frameworks that will impose reduce 
emissions. Or it might involve subsiding clean technology to induce consumers and firms to switch 
away from fossil fuels. Or it might involve campaigning against subsidies to fossil fuel companies 
(Caney 2014a). 
 
These represent, I believe, the options available to agents.  Given this, we can now formulate the 
specific version of the first claim.  It should be stated as follows: 
Principle 1specific version. When some fail to comply with their climate responsibilities, a 
nonideal theory of climate justice must select from the following responses that are 
available to agents: (i) Target Modification, (ii) Responsibility Reallocation, (iii) Burden-
Shifting I, (iv) Burden Shifting II, (v) Compromising Moral Ideals, and (6) Changing the 
Incentive Structure (hereafter Principle 1sv). 
 
I I I :  A Guiding Normative Theory 
 
§1. Suppose that an agent has this taxonomy in front of her.  This is clearly insufficient to guide 
her for it contains no ethical guidance.  This leads to my second claim: 
 Principle 2general version: Any nonideal theory of climate justice must draw on an integrationist 
normative theory (hereafter Principle 2gv). 
																																																								
8 I have outlined these options in much greater detail elsewhere. See Caney (2016). 
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Principle 2gv contains within it two commitments.  It claims, first, that when an agent considers 
what she ought to do in a nonideal context she should draw on a normative theory. Second, it 
claims that the theory must be what I have termed an integrationist one. 
To take the first point first: an agent considering her course of action needs some way to 
evaluate the costs of competing options and some non-arbitrary way of determining trade-offs.  
Note, this does not mean relying on some vision of the perfect society and trying to read off from 
that what should be done.  It does, though, require drawing on a normative theory. We have to 
have some basis for comparing different courses of action, and I see no way of doing that – and 
doing it responsibly – other than drawing on a normative theory, with its core guiding values and 
commitments. 9   For a Rawlsian, for example, this would involve not just considered moral 
judgements and principles, but also general background theories (Rawls 1999, pp.42-45; Daniels 
1996, chapter 1 & 2). 
 To apply this to the case at hand, an agent faced with noncompliance needs to consider 
whether she should, for example, take on greater responsibilities or whether the appropriate 
response is to reduce the level of protection owed to the vulnerable. To do this she has to consider 
what best fulfills the underlying normative ideals.  If, for example, she is a Bangladeshi villager it 
will be implausible to say that she should reduce her emissions.  If, however, she is a wealthy US 
citizen then further reducing her emissions might be the right course of action. 
 
§2. I turn now to the second commitment.  I need now to explain what I mean by an 
integrationist theory.  I define an integrationist approach as one that considers a given issue, X, 
(say, climate change) in conjunction with other issues (like poverty, development, health, 
migration, other environmental issues such as ozone layer depletion and ocean acidification) and 
treats them both as part of a more general normative theory.  An Integrationist approach can be 
contrasted with an Isolationist one, where the latter treats a given issue, X, in isolation from all 
other issues, and creates a theory focused specifically and exclusively on X on its own (Caney 
2012).  An integrationist theory thus uses a wide scope and includes other issues together, 
whereas an isolationist theory uses a narrow scope and brackets out other issues. 
 Why is an integrationist approach required for nonideal theory? In response: the central 
reason is that climate change and the policies needed to combat climate change are inextricably 
interconnected with a series of other issues (such as development, trade, migration, other 
environmental issues, cultural rights) such that to evaluate which of the six responses delineated 
above to adopt requires one to evaluate the effects of each on a wide set of persons’ interests.  
Adopting a narrow scope here is not a plausible option for both climatic changes and climate 
policies affect a large range of persons’ interests, usually influencing the same interests. 
 Consider, for example, the third response to noncompliance that I identified – Burden 
Shifting I.  The thought here is that in the face of noncompliance one might permit agents to 
engage in mitigation (and adaptation) policies that impose harms on third parties (harms that one 
would ordinarily forbid but one is grudgingly willing to permit here to increase much needed 
mitigation and adaptation).  Such policies generally have a ripple effect and adversely affect 
people in a wide range of contexts.  Some examples will help bring out what is at stake.  Consider, 
for example, imposing a carbon tax on goods, which, since it covers the carbon dioxide emitted in 
transporting goods from developing countries, prices them out of the market and thereby 																																																								
9  For instructive discussions see Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska’s account of what they term 
a “theory of ideals” (Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012, pp.53-58), Stemplowksa (2008) and Swift 
(2008). 
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contributes to the impoverishment of farmers in Africa.  Or consider a system of ‘feed-in tariffs’ 
whereby consumers are remunerated for building their own solar energy panel (or wind turbine) 
and selling excess energy back to the National Grid. In practice these are regressive because only 
wealthy energy consumers can afford the solar panels and wind turbines and the cost of the 
remuneration (and often subsidy) is passed on to the general consumer – meaning that poorer 
people are subsidising wealthier people.  Whilst this makes a positive contribution to combating 
climate change it may adversely affect some people’s health (they may no longer be able to heat 
themselves) or pursue other goals (because they have less disposable income). Or consider 
biofuels policies: these have been justified as a way of reducing reliance on fossil fuels.  However, 
there have been concerns that biofuel production (including, for example, US bioethanol 
production from corn) has led to a spike in food prices (as the increased demand for crops pushed 
up the price of food), that bioethanol production from sugar cane in Brazil has resulted in violations 
of labour rights, and that palm oil biodiesel production in Malaysia has led to land grabs (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2011, pp.28-41).  Nonideal climate policies thus affect a number of different 
interests (in health, access to land, food security, and autonomy). 
Note now that the same is also true of response 1 (which, recall, recommends aiming for 
a less ambitious climate target).  For this response would also adversely affect a wide range of 
persons’ interests, including the same as those listed above.  It results in threats to health (through 
the increased spread of infectious diseases), famine (because higher temperatures will result in 
crop failure), poverty (because people’s livelihoods are threatened by severe weather events, like 
storm surges and flooding) and loss of land (because of rising sea-levels and the resulting effects 
in small island states and coastal settlements). 
Given this it would be a mistake to treat climate change on its own as a separate domain 
governed by its own principles: both climate change itself and the nonideal policies needed to 
avert it impact on a wide set of interests (in health, food, autonomy, land, and autonomy among 
others).  We are not faced here with separate domains that can be governed by their own internal 
principle, but a well-integrated social, economic and environmental system.  To use Socrates’ 
metaphor from the Phaedrus, the social world is not carved into domains like ‘climate’ and 
‘development’ and ‘health’ and ‘migration’, such that if one treats ‘climate’, say, in isolation one is 
carving nature at the joints. Rather one is more like Socrates’ “incompetent butcher” hacking into 
meat and not following the natural joints (Plato 2002, 265e). 
Suppose that someone is unpersuaded and insists that there are principles of justice that 
apply specifically to climate change (and similarly principles of ‘development justice’, ‘trade justice’, 
‘health justice’, ‘migration justice’, ‘procreative justice’ and so on).  Even they will have to accept 
something like Principle 2gv for they will necessarily have to consider what to do when pursuing 
climate justice comes at the cost of development justice or individual rights.  They cannot think that 
each of these separate sets of principles gives all things considered reasons for action for there 
will be cases where realizing one set of principles might necessarily compromise another.  They 
must regard their principles of ‘climate justice’ as pro tanto and thus need some general normative 
framework from which to determine what all things considered they should do in these cases. 
 
§3. Having argued that we need an integrated general theory we now obviously have to consider 
what our guiding normative theory should be?  Clearly, I lack the space to develop and defend one 
here.  I thus draw on one I have defended elsewhere.  This has two core features.  First, it is 
committed to an egalitarian conception of global justice (Caney 2005a, chapter 4).  Second, it 
holds that people’s shares should be defined in terms of their enjoyment of what Martha 
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Nussbaum (2006) and Amartya Sen (2009, part III) have termed capabilities.  I here follow 
Nussbaum’s instructive specification of capabilities, so that comprises: “life”, “bodily health”, “bodily 
integrity”, “senses, imagination, and thought”, “emotions”, “practical reason”, “affiliation”, “other 
species”, “play” and “control over one’s environment” (Nussbaum 2006, pp.76-78).  With all this in 
mind then we can reframe the second principle as follows: 
Principle 2specific version: Any nonideal theory of climate justice must draw on a broadly 
egalitarian theory of global justice that employs a capabilities framework (hereafter 
Principle 2sv). 
Those readers who have a different account can reformulate this using their own account. 
 
IV: Feasibi l i ty 
 
We are now equipped to move to a third essential component of a nonideal account of climate 
justice.  This can be stated as follows: 
Principle 3general version: For any agent her course of action should be informed by the 
opportunities available and constraints she faces (hereafter Principle 3gv). 
Principle 3gv instructs agents to identify the possibilities that they have in front of them and identify 
what opportunities she has to make a difference and what obstacles there are. 
 
What does this mean in the case of climate change?  Combating climate change requires 
furthering mitigation, enabling people to adapt and pursuing compensation for those harmed.  With 
this in mind we can reformulate Principle 3gv:  as follows: 
 Principle 3specific version: For any agent her course of action should be informed by the 
opportunities available for mitigating, adapting or compensating climate change and 
opportunities for enabling/inducing others to mitigate, adapt, compensate climate change 
(hereafter Principle 3sv). 
In practice, this justifies a wide suite of actions.  It is particularly relevant for my sixth response 
since this requires coordinating with others to try to change the institutional framework within which 
people operate.  For example, university students, as members of an academic community and in 
virtue of their inclusion (at least in many universities) in Student Unions and various consultative 
bodies, have the opportunity to campaign for their university to divest from fossil fuels.  Someone 
with legal expertise may have the opportunity to offer their skills and work with others to engage in 
climate litigation. 10   Others can assist in developing and supporting initiatives for seeking 
compensation for “loss and damage”. Someone who is a respected member of a community that 
has traditionally been hostile to initiatives to adopt mitigation policies has a greater opportunity to 
change minds than someone perceived to be an outsider.  All of the above should also seek to 
identify strategies that converge with the goals of others, and should exploit those potential 
sources of commonality.  For example, many mitigation policies have co-benefits (cleaner air from 
reduced emissions, greater health from more cycling, etc). 
																																																								
10 Some, for example, draw on the doctrine of public trust and engage in ‘atmospheric trust 
litigation’.  See the discussion of ‘atmospheric trust litigation’ in Wood (2014, p.220ff).  See also 
the work of the non-governmental organization ‘Our Children’s Trust’ (http://ourchildrenstrust.org).  
For an instructive analysis of ‘climate change liability’ and what it means in practice in 17 different 
countries and the European Union see Lord, Goldberg, Rajamani, & Brunnée (2012) Climate 
Change Liability: Transnational Law and Practice. 
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We should note here that although Principle 3sv is, to a large extent, about political 
feasibility defined in terms of the degree of political opposition or political support for certain 
courses of action there is more to it than that.  For example: Suppose that a country’s existing 
housing stock is approaching a stage when it needs renewal.  Or, suppose that an existing power 
plant is coming to the end of its natural lifetime.  Or suppose that an existing treaty is coming to its 
end (in the way that the Millennium Development Goals were designed to come to an end in 
2015): then is a good opportunity to make progress.  
In all of these cases there is a “window of opportunity” that exists at some specific time, 
and which may not be relevant later.  Agents seeking to further justice in a nonideal world thus 
need to be aware of opportunities on the horizon, and to exploit them. 
 
V: Why Responsibi l i t ies wil l  Vary Between Different Agents 
 
Having defended three principles, I now want to note an implication of two of them.  The 
implication is this: 
 Principle 4general version: What response should be adopted in response to noncompliance 
will vary from one agent to another (hereafter Principle 4gv). 
 
There are two reasons for this.  The first is normative and stems from Principle 2gv.  Agents differ in 
the extent to which they currently enjoy what they are entitled to enjoy.  Compare three agents: 
one has more than their fair share, a second has a little bit less than what they are entitled to, 
whereas a third falls radically beneath what they are entitled to.  In such circumstances, then, 
other things being equal, the first should take a lead, followed by the second, and it might unfair to 
ask anything of the third.  The core point is that one cannot simply say, in the face of 
noncompliance, that others should (or should not) take on an increased share of responsibilities.  It 
depends on their standard of living and how it compares to what they are entitled to (Caney 2005b, 
pp.771-772).  Crudely, what we can reasonably expect of Bangladesh is different from what we 
can expect of Germany. 
  
A second reason for endorsing Principle 4gv concerns feasibility and stems from Principle 3gv 
(Lawford-Smith 2013, pp.244, 250-251, 253 & 256; Solum 2008, pp.314-315).  Agents differ in the 
kinds of opportunity available to them.  (For example, some have the opportunity to influence 
divestment and others not.)  And they differ in the extent to which they face obstacles and have 
power at their disposal; some may have very little, others a considerable sway.  Two agents may 
both be able to influence whether a university or corporation divests or not, but one may have 
more power.  In such a circumstance it follows, again, other things being equal, that the first has a 
greater responsibility to take up action.  As the examples given in Section III bring out, different 
actors face different types of opportunity and they may also differ in the extent to which they can 
make a difference. 
 
Of course, we should note that, at a more abstract level, we can make some general claims about 
all actors.  For example, to draw on a point made by Holly Lawford-Smith, one can plausibly argue 
that all agents have a duty to ‘signal’ to others their willingness to cooperate (Lawford-Smith 2015).  
However, when we come to specifying precise courses of action, what actions an agent should 
perform depends on their normative situation and the powers at their disposal.  There is no single 
concrete course of action that is the best for all actors.  
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VI: I l lustrat ive Examples 
 
Given the argument of Section IV, a comprehensive statement of who ought to do what in the face 
of noncompliance would have to engage in an exhaustive analysis of all the different possible 
agents and the options available to each.  To attempt to do this here would be quixotic.  However, 
not to say more might be to leave matters at an unhelpfully abstract level.  Given this, in this 
section I shall give some illustrative examples to bring out what responses might be appropriate for 
some actors.  We face here a choice between two strategies: one would be to start with all 
possible duty-bearers and explore what each could do.  A second would be to start with what 
needs to be done to overcome noncompliance and work back from that as to who should do it.  
Given that our focus is on mitigating climate change (as well as furthering adaptation and securing 
compensation for loss and damage), and that it is such a pressing task, this second approach 
seems to me more appropriate for it is better suited to providing an effective course of action.  
What then needs to be done?  
 
 Here are four crucial objectives for addressing noncompliance. 
 
A: Clean Energy.   A crucial (perhaps the most pressing) goal is to develop and transfer clean 
technologies.  Three factors combine to make this a pressing imperative.  First, humanity can 
permissibly emit only a small volume of greenhouse gases (the limited and shrinking greenhouse 
gas budget).  As we saw at the start of this essay, if we set aside other greenhouse gases and 
focus on having a 50% chance of avoiding a 2°C increase then humanity could emit a trillion 
tonnes of carbon.  And as I reported above, “half [445 to 585 PgC] of this budget was already 
emitted by 2011” (Collins and Knutti 2013, p.1033).  At the same time, second, many have a 
pressing need to use energy to develop and lift themselves and others out of poverty (the 
developmental imperative).  Even if others complied with their responsibilities to reduce their 
emissions, securing development without triggering dangerous climate change would be a 
formidable challenge.  However, the problem is greatly compounded because of a third factor: so 
many have failed to reduce their emissions (pervasive noncompliance).  Given these three factors 
- limited greenhouse gas budget, the developmental imperative and pervasive noncompliance - it 
is vital that humanity develops new sources of clean energy, and that it does so in ways such that 
everyone throughout the world, now and in the future, can enjoy them.11 
 Working back from this, we can say that those who are able to affect the creation and/or 
transfer of clean energy have a duty to do so and to help the shift to a non-carbon economy.  This 
entails, for example, that research scientists have a reason to do research on developing clean 
technology; that those with access to funding (such as governments, universities and research 
councils) allocate it in such a way that it incentivizes the production and transfer of such resources; 
and, that citizens press and campaign for research funding.  It also gives those with legal expertise 
reason to frame intellectual property laws in such a way as to further the twin goals of incentivizing 
clean technology and sharing it.  A promising example is Thomas Pogge’s proposal for an 
‘Ecological Impact Fund’.  Under this scheme governments divert resources into the Fund.  
Companies are then rewarded to the extent that they develop and transfer clean technologies.  																																																								
11 For instructive discussions of the importance of clean energy innovation and transfer see Scott 
Barrett (2003, pp.393-398), Dieter Helm (2012, chapter 11), Matthew Rimmer (2011) and David 
Victor (2011, chapter 5). 
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The central idea is to utilize self-interest and design an intellectual property regime so as to 
harness this in order to generate socially beneficial outcomes (Pogge 2010, pp.539-542).  This is a 
paradigmatic case of a nonideal climate initiative: it does not rest on rosy assumptions about 
human nature, and it seeks rather to harness existing nonmoral motives in order to increase 
compliance. 
 
B: Fossil  Fuel Subsidies.  Consider now a second nonideal climate initiative.  Many 
governments spend a great deal of money subsidizing fossil fuels, thereby lowering the price of 
consuming fossil fuels below what it would otherwise be.  The International Energy Agency reports 
that in 2013 governments spent $548 billion on fossil fuel subsidies – four times what they spent 
on renewables and also four times what they spent on initiatives to increase energy efficiency (IEA 
2014, p.314).  Such enormous subsidies (comprising both consumer subsidies and producer 
subsidies) have several predictable malign consequences.  First, of course, they thereby increase 
fossil fuel consumption. Second, such subsidies also prevent renewable energy sources from 
being competitive.  A defender of such subsidies might respond that some such subsidies – 
particularly consumer subsidies designed to make energy consumption more affordable – is 
justified because it helps meet the needs of the most vulnerable.  However, the International 
Energy Agency also reveals that “a large share … of the subsidies aimed at helping the poor often 
ends up going to higher income households, as they can afford to consume more of the subsidised 
fuels, aggravating the very inequality they are meant to reduce” (IEA 2014, pp.317-318).  Indeed, 
“only 8% of the money spent on fossil-fuel subsidies reaches the poorest 20% of the population … 
other direct forms of welfare support would cost much less” (IEA 2014, p.318). 
 Who can address this kind of problem?  Members of environmental groups can publicise 
the extent of these practices and make them visible. Economists can vigorously draw attention to 
the harmful effects of subsidies and make the case for their removal. Citizens can put pressure on 
political parties and politicians.  Furthermore, there can be some convergence here between those 
of different political persuasions.  For example, those in the centre and on the left who object to 
these particular subsidies can join forces with classical liberals and libertarians who will be 
skeptical of all subsidies financed by taxation (though they may part ways on financing clean 
technology). 
 
C: Framing.  In addition to the above, one core task that is of vital importance is maintaining 
sufficient electoral support for governments to implement radical mitigation policies and sustain 
them over time.  This then puts a premium on communicating the effects of climate change in such 
a way that it resonates with citizens.  Now as the psychological literature on climate change 
testifies this is a challenging task, and there are many cognitive and other biases which make this 
hard to realize.12 Given this, it is vital that those who can and do play a role in communicating the 
causes, nature and impacts of climate change - political leaders, climate scientists, journalists, and 
teachers - ‘frame’ the issues surrounding climate change in ways that speak to everyday citizens.  
This requires, for example, attention to the language used and the norms invoked and it speaks to 
the role of rhetoric.  It is important, for example, that climate change is framed in ways that appeal 
to adherents to different political ideologies (Wolsko, Ariceaga, & Seiden 2016, pp.7-19). 
 																																																								
12 For pertinent psychological analyses see Johnson and Levine (2009, pp.1593-1603), Markowitz, 
& Shariff (2012, pp.243-247) and Weber (2006, pp.103–120; 2010, pp.332-342). 
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D: Exemplif ication and Visions of the Future.   Finally, it is important for political leaders 
and for the general public to have a vision of what a non-carbon society would look like.  Many, for 
example, may struggle to know what living in a society that is not reliant on fossil fuels will be like, 
and how to get there.  This lack of a vision can be unsettling (since it is unknown) and without a 
vision of the future it may be hard to motivate people.  For these reasons those who are able to 
make vivid to people what a post-carbon society would be like, and what it would be like to live in 
one can play a vital motivational role.  One possible illustration of this is the phenomenon of 
‘Transition Towns’, which are projects to exemplify the environmental ideal at the local level.13 
 
Many more examples could be given of other equally crucial policies - most importantly, facilitating 
mitigation policies such as carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes; campaigning for 
infrastructural changes that do not lock us into a high carbon future; shareholders and others 
pressuring major institutions, such as universities, to divest from fossil fuels; enhancing 
reproductive autonomy, thereby lowering the numbers of unwanted pregnancies and thus reducing 
demographic pressures on the environment.  My point here is simply to put flesh on the bones of 
the rather abstract principles defended above, and to give some sense of some ways they could 
be put in practice. 
 
VII:  The Governance Question 
 
My focus in this paper is on what I earlier termed the Responsibility Question, As I noted above, 
though, since one of the responsibilities is to engage in political action it would be remiss not to 
say anything at all about the extent to which those who engage in political actions should seek to 
reform or work with the existing decision-making processes.  And so we must say something about 
what I earlier termed the Governance Question, where this is defined as follows: 
Q2: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance 
structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? 
I have addressed the question of how we might rethink domestic institutions elsewhere (Caney in 
press) and so here I shall focus on the international context.14 
 
How should one proceed?  A full and systematic answer to this would mirror the methodology I 
adopted with the Responsibility Question.  That is, it would (i) set out the different possible 
responses to poorly functioning institutions, (ii) present and defend an underlying normative theory 
concerning institutional design, and (iii) develop an account of what is feasible.  Space precludes a 
comprehensive analysis comprising (i) to (iii).  Instead I will put forward one proposal that I think 
nicely exemplifies an appropriate response to a nonideal governance regime. 
 
The proposal can be expressed in three steps: 
First: An ideal governance regime would be democratically inclusive, and it would realize some 
important substantive principles of justice (namely, effectively reducing emissions, distributing 
burdens equitably, enforcing a just set of adaptation policies, and implementing ‘loss and damage’ 
policies).  Since, however, an ideal regime is not available, we should start with the existing 																																																								
13 For some information concerning the Transition movement see: 
https://www.transitionnetwork.org/. 
14 See also Caney (2014b). 
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institutional architecture and negotiating process.  We should not wish away inconvenient aspects 
of the current regime, but bear them in mind as constraining factors. 
Second: in this vein we might look to the most recent international treaty (at the time of writing) – 
the Paris Agreement.  Contained therein are some important features.  In particular, the Paris 
Agreement proposes that parties each declare their mitigation plans, and that these are then 
reviewed on a regular basis.  Thus Article 14.1 of the Paris Agreement states that  
“The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement shall periodically take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess 
the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term 
goals (referred to as the “global stocktake”). It shall do so in a comprehensive and 
facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation 
and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science.”15 
The first such “global stocktake” is scheduled for 2023 and then it will be held “every five years 
thereafter” (Article 14.2).  In addition to this, however, paragraph 20 of the text specifying the 
‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ requires there to be “a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 
2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties”.16  The salient point then is that the current 
regime has created a system including a “facilitative dialogue” and a “global stocktake”.17 
Third: This provides the context for the proposal. The proposal is that organizations can, and 
should, operate within this existing governance structure and ought to exploit these review 
processes and mechanisms to hold governments to account.  This would entail, for example, that 
NGOs, political parties, religious organizations, climate scientists, and others put pressure on their 
governments during critical periods.  For example, it is valuable for NGOs to publish reports 
ranking parties in terms of their compliance with this, or to produce a league table of how each 
government is doing (both in terms of how ambitious its commitments are and to what extent it is 
matching them).18  They might initiate a series of public discussions in each country of how well it 
is doing in meeting its objectives in the lead-in to the review period; and build progress reports and 
parliamentary debates on these into the national legislative process. 
 
This, I believe, exemplifies a non-ideal response to the existing international climate regime.  It 
takes the existing architecture as a starting point, and seeks to find ways to build on it (all the while 
bearing in mind other more long-term and more radical processes of reform). 
 
* 
 
As I have stressed above, much more can, and should, be said about responding to 
noncompliance.  What I hope to have done is to outline how agents should decide what to do 																																																								
15 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf. 
16 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf. 
17 Interestingly, Thomas Schelling proposed a scheme that is similar in nature to this.  See his 
discussion of what he terms “multilateral reciprocal scrutiny” in Schelling (1997, pp.10-12: also, 
1992, pp.12-13). 
18 For an example of what I have in mind see Climate Action Tracker which assesses countries’ 
‘Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’. 
http://climateactiontracker.org/ 
See also Climate Analytics: 
http://climateanalytics.org/what-we-do/climate-policy-analysis.html?theme=24 
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when others fail to discharge their climate responsibilities (Sections II—V), to indicate concrete 
courses of action (Section VI), and to draw attention to how agents might also respond to the 
inadequate governance structures, and again to outline a specific course of action (Section VII).  
Without a sustained campaign along the lines defended above, the prospects of achieving a just 
and effective response to climate change remain bleak indeed. 
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